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In this paper, we study economic development in a panel of 84 countries from 1970 to 2005. We 
focus on characterizing heterogeneities in the development effects of macroeconomic policies 
and on comparing the development process as measured by GDP to that measured by the Human 
Development Index (HDI). We do so within a novel dynamic panel modelling framework that 
can account for crucial aspects of both the cross-sectional and intertemporal features of the 
observed process of economic development, and that can capture the dependence of the 
development effects of macroeconomic policies on differences in countries' persistent 
characteristics, such as their social norms and institutions. Among our findings are that 
macroeconomic policies affect economic development with less delay than suggested by 
conventional econometric frameworks, yet impact HDI with longer delay and overall less 
strongly than GDP. Differences in countries' persistent characteristics may even affect the sign of 
the long-run development effects of a given macroeconomic policy: Fiscal stimuli in the form of 
government consumption positively affect GDP in countries with low institutional quality, but 
negatively affect long-run GDP in countries with high institutional quality. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 Introduction
Research aimed at understanding countries’ long-run economic development has been a
cornerstoneoftheoreticalandempiricaleconomicinvestigationsformanydecades. While
substantial progress has been made during the last couple of decades, various issues re-
main controversially discussed or have received attention only recently. Among these
issues are in particular (i) how correlates of economic growth can be distinguished from
factors that are causal for economicgrowth, (ii)how thecontributionsof key development
policies to advances in economic prosperitymay depend on a country’sinstitutions,social
norms and other societal characteristics, as well as (iii) whether measures other than out-
put/income should be considered when comparing economic development across coun-
tries. In this paper, we study economic development in a panel of 84countries from 1970
to 2005. We investigate heterogeneities in the development e ects of macroeconomic
policies, and compare the development process as measured by GDP to that measured by
the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI). We do so within a novel dynamic
panel modellingframework that can account for crucial aspects of boththecross-sectional
and intertemporal features of the observed process of economic development. The frame-
work we propose can also characterize a possible state dependence of the development
e ects of macroeconomic policies on di erences in countries’ persistent characteristics,
such as their social norms and institutions as well as other key societal characteristics
within which the development process takes place.
To motivate our panel modelling framework, it is useful to note that the predominant in-
vestigative tool used in the empirical output growth literature continues to be the “Barro
regression”, in which a country’s rate of output growth during a certain time period is re-
gressed on an initialconditionfor thelevelof outputand avarietyof otherpotentialoutput
1growth determinants.1 There are a number of problems with this Barro regression frame-
work, however, which limit its usefulness for empirical analysis.2 A ﬁrst issue casting
doubt on the appropriateness of the Barro regression framework is that - random e ects
apart - all cross-country heterogeneities of the output growth process are assumed to be
fully captured by di erent realizations of the regression’s explanatory variables. This
is, however, extremely unlikely to be satisﬁed in practice, as due to ﬁnite sample issues
only a limited number of explanatory variables - capturing only a portion of the overall
cross-country heterogeneity - can be considered, and as many of the systematic di er-
ences prevailing across countries are di cult to observe or to measure. For this reason,
Islam (1995) and Evans (1996) were among the ﬁrst in the recent empirical output growth
literature to move beyond the Barro regression framework, advocating to consider panel
ﬁxed-e ects models, with the ﬁxed e ects accounting for time-invariant factors, such as
a country’s institutional and political environment, that exhibit systematic (as opposed to
purely random) variation across countries. Pursuing this line of thought further, however,
not only may countries’ systematically di ering societal characteristics imply di erent
conditional means for the steady-state distribution of the relevant development measure,
but countries may also feature di erent slopes of their steady-state growth paths, due to
prolonged di erences, say, in the rate of technological progress. As has been argued by
Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997) and Binder and Pesaran (1999), assuming that countries
in the steady state grow at the same rate when steady-state growth rates in fact di er,
leads to serious fallacies in empirical inference. More generally, a promising econometric
framework for studying economic development beyond allowing for ﬁxed e ects must
capture systematic heterogeneities in growth dynamics also. A second issue of concern
1This regressionframeworkhas becomepopularin empiricalworkfollowingtheseminal paperbyBarro
(1991).
2See also Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) for a recent discussion of some of these issues. In this paper we
take a di erent perspective than Hauk and Wacziarg (2009), however, by arguing in favor of a dynamic
panel model-based inference approach as being the appropriate means for the cross-country econometric
analysis of economic development.
2with default Barro regressions is that they are subject to endogeneity bias. Regressions
of, say, output growth on a variable such as the rate of investment in physical capital
that a priori postulate investment in physical capital to be exogenous may help one to
understand the strength of the association of output growth with investment in physical
capital, but cannot provide evidence as to whether investment in physical capital is in fact
a determinant of a country’s rate of output growth in the sense that a higher rate of invest-
ment in physical capital would precede accelerated output growth (as it may well be that
a higher rate of investment in physical capital merely is a result of higher output levels
and/or higher output growth rates). For purposes of policy analysis, it is clearly desirable,
however, to work with an econometric framework that can distinguish between correlates
and determinants of economic growth.3 Third in terms of concerns with the Barro re-
gression framework is that it does not feature a data-driven distinction between short- and
long-run dynamics, and is not designed to deal with the possible presence of unit roots in
thedata and resulting issues of non-ergodicity(see Binder and Pesaran, 1999). Fourth and
ﬁnally, there is mounting evidence that the process of economic development is subject
to important nonlinearities, such as the dependence of the development e ects of macroe-
conomic policies on country-speciﬁc conditions. Such nonlinearities are not captured by
defaultBarro regressions. See, forexample, Rodr´ ıguez(2007)and Binder, Georgiadisand
Sharma (2010). Taking all four of these issues together, there appears to be a clear need
for empirical work on economic development to move beyond econometric techniques as
typically used in the empirical output growth literature.
Beyond giving careful consideration to econometric modelling issues, in this paper we
also go beyond a strictly output-/income-based analysis of the development process. As
prominently advocated by Sen (1999), the ultimate goal of economic development poli-
cies should be to enhance - in a rather broad sense - the set of people’s opportunities.
3We should mention that there is important work tackling this endogeneity issue within the framework
of Barro regressions. See, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
3The empirical growth literature to date has, however, primarily focused on investigating
the determinants of the level of output (income) per capita and its growth rate. While it
is obviously true that a higher level of output/income can a ord an expanded set of con-
sumption goods, the focus of the empirical growth literature on output/income measures
mightcloud otherkey aspects ofthe completeset ofopportunitiesavailableto individuals,
as eminently described in the ﬁrst Human Development Report in 1990:
First, national income ﬁgures, useful though they are for many purposes, do
notreveal thecompositionofincomeor thereal beneﬁciaries. Second, people
often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in
higher measured income or growth ﬁgures: Better nutrition and health ser-
vices, greater access to knowledge, more secure livelihoods, better working
conditions, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure
hours, and a sense of participating in the economic, cultural and political
activities of their communities. Of course, people also want higher incomes
as one of their options. But income is not the sum total of human life.
It therefore appears to be sensible to consider replacing/augmenting output as the sole
measure of economic development by an alternative measure that shifts the focus of de-
velopment economics from solely output-oriented to human-life-oriented policy design.4
Taking into account both these econometric and data-measurement considerations, in this
paper, then, we move beyond a Barro regression based analysis of output growth. We
take advantage of newly released United Nations HDI data, and examine some key as-
pects of these (as well as GDP) data within a novel dynamic panel modelling framework.
In particular, we adapt a panel autoregressivedistributed lag model with conditionally ho-
mogenous(state-dependent) long-run coe cients, as proposed by Binder and O ermanns
4We follow the lead of work in the United Nations Development Program, for example Gray Molina
and Purser (2010), in moving beyond output-based development analysis.
4(2007) as well as Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma (2010). The conditional pooled mean
group (CPMG) state-dependent panel model introduced in these papers appears to be
well-suited for the analysis of the determinants of HDI, as it can capture crucial aspects of
boththe cross-sectionalas well as intertemporalfeatures ofthe HDIdevelopmentprocess,
and can overcome the problems associated with the Barro regression approach detailed
above. In particular, theCPMG state-dependentpanel model(i)features adata-drivendis-
tinction between short- and long-run dynamics, (ii) allows for systematic cross-country
heterogeneity in intercepts and dynamics while also identifying features of the develop-
ment process that are common across countries, (iii) allows for the explanatory variables
to be potentially endogenous, and (iv) remains applicable even when there are unit roots
in the data. Perhaps most importantly, however, the CPMG state-dependent panel model
allows us to investigate whether the development e ects of changes in macroeconomic
policies on HDI (GDP) vary across di erent types of societal environments within which
the development process takes place. Modelling the development e ects that macroeco-
nomic policies have on HDI (GDP) as being dependent on slowly time-varying indices
measuring countries’persistentcharacteristics appears to be a noveland promisingway to
reconcile a ﬁxed e ects empirical growth model with an analysis of social norms, institu-
tions and other societal characteristics that are typically emphasized in empirical analyses
using the (random e ects based) Barro regression framework.5 In this spirit, our approach
to modelling state dependence of the development e ects of macroeconomic policies in-
volves modelling these e ects as a function of indices involving grouped combinations of
variables that in the recent empirical growth literature have been found to robustly a ect
output growth.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide some
stylized facts about the HDI development process, contrasting it to that for GDP. In Sec-
5It is important to recall that in a ﬁxed e ects panel data model one cannot identify the e ects of strictly
time-invariant regressors.
5tion 3, we discuss our panel modelling framework, putting emphasis on how our model
in a novel form captures both country ﬁxed e ects and the cross-country variation of the
development e ects of economic policies along countries’ persistent characteristics such
as its social norms and institutions. We also discuss our set of state variables measuring
such persistent characteristics in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our main empirical
results, contrasting these results to those we obtain for our data from conventional Barro
regressions. We concludein Section 5, also indicatingsomedirections for futureresearch.
Several appendices provide details on data measurement and computational/econometric
issues.
2 Some Stylized Facts About HDI Trends
While the (to date) o cial United Nations data for HDI are available only from 1980
onwards and for a total of 82 countries, the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) HDI data
set that we can take advantage of in this paper signiﬁcantly expands HDI data coverage
both across years and countries: The Gray Molina and Purser (2010) data set spans 111
countries from 1970 to 2005.6 We focus in this paper on those of these 111 countries
6It may be useful to brieﬂy recall the measurement of HDI: HDI is constructed as an index aggregat-
ing information on the stage of human development as contained in GDP per capita, life expectancy, and
education as measured by school enrolment and the adult literacy rate. Denoting by gdp 
it the logarithm of
GDP per capita, by life 
it life expectancy at birth, by tgerit the tertiary gross enrolment rate, and by literit



















and with two of the components of HDI being re-scaled prior to entering on the right-hand side of Equation
(1), so as to fall into the unit interval, [0,1]:
lifeit =
life 
it   25
85   25
, (2)
6for which there is a su cient number of time-series observations available for them to be
included in the estimation of our state-dependent panel model, leaving us with a “world”
sample of 84countries.7 Figure 1 provides the evolution of key ﬁrst and second moments
of the cross-sectional distributions of HDI for subsets of countries, and Figure 2 plots the
evolutions of the cross-sectional distributions themselves. When interpreting the plots (of
themomentsof)thesedistributions,itshouldbekeptinmindthatHDIandGDPpercapita
may not be ergodic variables - that is, they may not converge to time-invariant steady-
state distributions, and second moments may not be well deﬁned (see Binder and Pesaran,
1999). With this caveat, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that, not too surprisingly, throughout the
sampleperiod theOECD countrieshave enjoyed thehighestlevelsof humandevelopment
followedbycountriesinLatinAmericaand theCaribbean, bycountriesinAsiaandﬁnally
by countries in Africa. Figures 1 and 2 also suggest that unconditional convergence of
HDI with respect to initial values has taken place, in the sense that HDI has generally
improved relatively more in less developed regions than in the OECD countries. The
median of HDI in the OECD countries from 1970 to 2005 rose by 13%, whereas it rose
by 22% in Latin America and the Caribbean, by 32% in Africa, and by 32% in Asia. The
most rapid catch-up with the OECD countries’ level of human development took place
in Asia, for which mean (though not yet median) human development in 2005 surpassed
that in Latin America and the Caribbean. Also, within each region except for Africa, the
standard deviation of the cross-sectional distribution of HDI has decreased from 1970 to
2005: The standard deviation for the OECD countries from 1970 to 2005 fell by 66%, for
the Latin American and Caribbean countries by 45%, and for the Asian countries by 23




it   log(100)
log(40,000)  log(100)
. (3)
7See Section 3 for a detailed discussion of our data availability criteria. Table 1 provides a listing of all
84 countries that enter our “world” sample.
7Analogously to Figures 1 and 2 for HDI, Figures 3 and 4 present the evolution of key
ﬁrst and second moments of the cross-sectional distributions of the logarithm of GDP
per capita and the evolutions of the cross-sectional distributions themselves. Comparing
Figures 3 and 4 for the logarithm of GDP per capita with Figures 1 and 2 for HDI, three
observations stand out: First, while all regions have experienced notable improvements
in HDI from 1970 to 2005, this is not the case for the logarithm of GDP per capita, as
the mean and median of African countries’ GDP per capita have not grown in comparable
magnitude as those of the OECD, Asian as well as Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries. Second, for the Latin American and Caribbean countries, the unconditional conver-
gence to OECD development levels apparently present in the evolution of the mean and
median of HDI does not appear to be present for the logarithm of GDP per capita. The
median of the logarithm of GDP per capita in the OECD countries from 1970 to 2005
rose by 7%, whereas it rose by 6% in Latin America and the Caribbean, by 1% in Africa,
and by 13% in Asia. Third, while except for Africa countries within a given region appear
to unconditionally converge towards a common level of HDI, with the exception of Asia
and of Latin America and the Caribbean there does not appear to be a general long-term
decline of the within-region standard deviations for the logarithm of GDP per capita.8
Finally in terms of stylized facts for our data, Figure 5 provides scatter plots of the HDI
levels in 2005 against the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005, of the changes in HDI
against GDP per capita growth rates between 1970 and 2005, and scatter plots of the
change in (growth of) HDI (GDP per capita) between 1970 and 2005 against initial HDI
(GDP per capita) in 1970. Still keeping in mind the caveat that HDI and GDP per capita
may not be ergodic variables, there is a strong positive correlation (with a correlation
coe cient of 0.96) between the levels of HDI and of the logarithm of GDP per capita
in 2005. The relationship between the change of HDI between 1970 and 2005 and the
8For a more detailed investigation of (unconditional) convergence of HDI and its components, see
Mayer-Foulkes (2010).
8growth of GDP per capita during the same time period also is positive, though with a
slope only about one third as large as for the corresponding levels relationship. While
there appears to be a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the initial
level of HDI in 1970 and the change of HDI between 1970 and 2005, pointing to the
presence of unconditional convergence for HDI, the same does not appear to be the case
for GDP per capita. To movebeyond such a simplegraphical and regression analysis inter
alia not involving any form of conditioning on country-speciﬁc characteristics and failing
to account for the possible lack of ergodicity of the levels of HDI and GDP per capita, we
move to our panel-econometric analysis.
3 Econometric Model
Let us consider a panel autoregressive distributed lag model, in which we allow the key
coe cientstobestatedependent, varyingas afunctionofa(pre-determined)conditioning
state variable, zi,t 1:
yit = µi +  i · t +
p  
k=1






ik(zi,t 1) · xi,t k +  it, t = r,r + 1,...,T, (4)
where yit denotes the dependent variable of country i at time t (hdiit or gdpit), µi and
 i denote ﬁxed-e ects intercept and time-trend terms, xit denotes an m   1 vector of
explanatory variables,  ik(zi,t 1) and   
ik(zi,t 1) denote state-dependent slope coe cients,





, i.i.d. across t, and
with the disturbance terms in addition being independent across i.9
9For ease of exposition we assume in Equation (4) that all explanatory variables enter with the same lag
order and that the time-series dimension is the same for all countries, involving observations for yit, xit and
zit for t = 0,1,...,T. In our empirical work, we certainly do allow for variable- and country-speciﬁc lag
9The principal idea underlying our consideration of a model with state-dependent coe -
cients is as follows: In the Barro regression framework, the e ects of time-invariant vari-
ables on the dependent variable are identiﬁed by restricting the country-speciﬁc e ects
to be random (rather than ﬁxed) e ects, imposing orthogonality between the country-
speciﬁc e ects and the model’s other regressors, including those in xit. As discussed in
the Introduction, such a random e ects restriction for cross-country models is implausi-
ble in empirical practice, as many of the developmentfactors forming the country-speciﬁc
e ects vary systematically (not randomly) across countries. It is thus imperative to allow
for ﬁxed-e ects intercepts, the µi’s in Equation (4). Of course, having introduced such
ﬁxed e ects, it is no longer possible to identify the e ects of any other regressors that are
strictly time-invariant. Our conditioning states, the zi,t 1’s, are indices involving variables
that reﬂect similar aspects of a country’s institutions, social norms or other key societal
characteristics. Carefully combining such variables, we ensure that the zi,t 1’s feature
some time variation. Our model thus overcomes the implausible and costly random ef-
fects restrictionoftheBarro regressionframework,10 withouthavingto passon examining
the quantitative importance of a country’s institutions and aspects of its social norms for
its development process.11
The error-correction representation of Equation (4), separating short- and long-run dy-
namics in a data-driven manner, is given by
 yit = µi +  i · t +  i(zi,t 1) · yit 1 +  
 
i(zi,t 1) · xi,t 1 +  
 
i(zi,t 1) · hit +  it
= µi +  i · t +  i(zi,t 1) ·
 
yi,t 1    
 




i(zi,t 1) · hit +  it, (5)
orders pi and qik, for k = 1,2,...,m and i = 1,2,...,N, as well as for an unbalanced panel of observations.
10In separate simulation work in progress, we document the magnitude of the parameter estimate biases
that may be incurred in the development context by erroneously modelling ﬁxed e ects as random e ects.
11Due to reasons of model parsimony, we will not consider model speciﬁcations allowing for more than
one conditioning state variable at a time, and will examine the inﬂuence of our set of conditioning state
variables in sequential form, one state variable at a time. See Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma (2010) for a
state-dependent dynamic panel data model with multivariate conditioning.
10where
 i(zi,t 1) =
 p
k=1  ik(zi,t 1)   1,  i(zi,t 1) =
 q
k=0  ik(zi,t 1),




k=2  ik(zi,t 1), 
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 i(zi,t 1) =   i(zi,t 1)/ i(zi,t 1).
Given the still relatively limited number of time-series observations typically available in
cross-country development panel data sets such as the one we use for this paper, we need
to restrict the degree of parameter variation allowed for by the model in Equation (5). To
this end, we specify the speed of adjustment and the other model short-run dynamics as
varying in unrestricted form across countries, but not varying with zi,t 1. Also introduc-
ing the weak conditional/state-dependent pooling restriction that countries that share the
same values of the conditioning state variables also share the same long-run multipliers,
 i(zi,t 1) =  (zi,t 1),12 we then have the conditional pooled mean group (CPMG) panel data
model
 yit = µi +  i · t +  i · yi,t 1 +  
 
i(zi,t 1) · xi,t 1 +  
 
i · hit +  it
= µi +  i · t +  i ·
 
yi,t 1    




i · hit +  it. (6)
12The restriction that  i(zi,t 1) =  (zi,t 1), i = 1,2,...,N, is obviously much weaker than the uncondi-
tional generic slope coe cient pooling restriction of Barro regressions and ﬁxed-e ects panel data models,
and also is signiﬁcantly weaker still than the unconditional long-run pooling restriction of the pooled mean
group model of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), namely  i(zi,t 1) =  , i = 1,2,...,N. See Binder and Of-
fermanns (2007) and Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma (2010) for previous empirical evidence in the context
of exchange rate and output growth dynamics that the weak conditional/state-dependent long-run pool-
ing restriction we consider here still sizeably increases the e ciency of parameter estimates compared to
country-speciﬁc time-series analyses.
11In this framework featuring conditional or state-dependent long-run homogeneity, all
transitional dynamics are fully country-speciﬁc, and the long-run dynamics are homo-
geneous only for countries sharing the same conditioning environments. Note that this
framework allows the long-run multipliers to di er across countries, but also over time
for a given country, with variations in the conditioning state variable. Clearly, such a
panel modelling framework cannot be a free lunch: For the model to be readily estimable
for the type of panel data set we are working with in this paper, the number of variables in
xit has to be limited, and the time-series dimension of the data available for each country
cannot be too small. Keeping these restrictions in mind, there are numerous advantages
of the panel modelling framework of Equation (6) for the analysis of the development
e ects of economic policies, speciﬁcally also when compared to Barro regressions, with
a typical such Barro regression given by
T
 1 · (yiT   yi0) =  0 +  1 · yi0 +  
  · xi +  
  · zi + viT. (7)
The advantages of our state-dependent dynamic panel data model in Equation (6) com-
pared to the Barro regression framework in Equation (7) stem from the facts that the
model in Equation (6)
(i) isan explicitlydynamicmodel, withstatisticallyoptimallag orders forall variables,
unlike the limited dynamic structure in Equation (7), which is imposed on the data
a priori;
(ii) allows for ﬁxed-e ects intercepts and time trends, µi and  i, whereas the model in
Equation (7) only allows for random-e ects intercepts as part of viT;
(iii) allows for ﬁxed-e ects type (systematically varying) short-run slope coe cients,
 i and  i, and long-run coe cients  (zi,t 1) that are in general identical only for the
12same realizations of the state variables, zi,t 1 – whereas the model in Equation (7)
imposes full (cross-sectional and intertemporal) invariance of the slope coe cients
in  1,   and  ;
(iv) allowsforcross-sectionallyheteroskedasticdisturbancetermvariances, whereasthe
disturbance term variance is typically assumed to be cross-sectionally homoskedas-
tic under the model in Equation (7);
(v) allows for non-linear terms in zi,t 1 and xit 1, whereas the model in Equation (7) is
fully linear.
In terms of substantive economic implications, these modelling features result in the fol-
lowing:
First, our model in Equation (6) lets the data determine as to what is labeled short- and
what is labeled long-run dynamics.13
Second, our model in Equation (6) features a high degree of cross-country heterogeneity
both concerning the short- and long-run parameters, while also capturing common long-
run features prevailing under the same conditioning environments. When discussing our
empirical results, we will highlight the substantive implications these two model features
have: The development e ects of changes in economic policies in our model set-up, un-
like in the set-up of the Barro regression, can vary across countries that feature di ering
social norms, institutions,and otherkey societal characteristics. As wewill document, the
variations of the e ects across countries can be sizeable, implying that policy recommen-
dations based on Barro regressions for many countries will be subject to a “one size ﬁts
all”fallacy ofsizeableproportions. As wewillalso document,thespeedwithwhichcoun-
13Note that in order to use annual data series, we need to interpolate in particular the HDI series, as these
are only available in quinquennial form. In separate simulation work, we document that our panel model’s
long-run coe cients (on which we focus in much of this paper) do reﬂect the variation actually available
in the non-GDP componentsof HDI. Also, the long-run coe cients are not sensitive to plausible variations
of the interpolation scheme we use for the HDI series.
13tries’ long-run development paths are reached after a development policy change exhibits
signiﬁcant cross-country variation. Barro regressions per construction cannot capture this
data feature, leading to mis-assessmentsconcerning the timehorizon required for changes
in economic policies to reach their long-run development e ects.
Third, as noted by Pesaran and Shin (1999), an autoregressivedistributed lag model of the
form of Equation (6) can e ectively deal with potential endogeneity of the explanatory
variables in xit. To expand upon this point, consider for illustrative purposes a simpliﬁed
special case of the model in Equation (4):
yit = µi +  i · t +  i(zi,t 1) · yi,t 1 +  i(zi,t 1) · xit +  it. (8)
Suppose that xit is correlated with  it:
xit =  i +  i · t +  i · xi,t 1 + uit, (9)
with Cov( it,uit) =   u,i   0. The least squares estimator of the coe cients in Equation
(8) clearly will be subject to an endogeneity bias. A great appeal of the autoregressive
distributed lag model is that this endogeneity can be readily overcome without needing






· uit +  it, (10)








xit    i · xi,t 1    i    i · t
 
+  it. (11)
Substituting from Equation (11) into Equation (8), we obtain an augmented autoregres-
sive distributed lag model model involving the additional regressor xi,t 1, but in which
14neither xit nor xi,t 1 causes an endogeneity bias, as Cov( it,uit) = Cov( it,ui,t 1) = 0. An
autoregressive distributed lag model can therefore be estimated by standard least squares
techniques, provided the model lag orders are not underspeciﬁed.
Fourth and ﬁnally, our model in Equation (6) allows us to investigate the dependence of
the long-run development e ects of economic policies on the state variables as varying
according to non-linear, ﬂexible-form functionals, for example Chebyshev polynomials.
See Binder and O ermanns (2007) and Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma (2010) for a more
detailed discussion of the rich set of nonlinearities this modelling approach can capture.
Before turning in the next section to the discussion of our empirical results, let us ﬁrst
outline our choices for the model variables, y, x, and z. For y, we choose hdi or the log-
arithm of gdp; in x, we include a set of variables that can be interpreted as capturing or
reﬂecting di erent types of economic policies aimed at improving human development
(output), namely the logarithm of per capita government consumption (lgovpc, reﬂect-
ing aspects of ﬁscal policy), the logarithm of per capita investment (private plus pub-
lic) in physical capital (linvpc, reﬂecting both aspects of ﬁscal policy and various policy
incentives for private sector saving and investment), and the logarithm of per capita im-
ports plus exports (lopennpc, reﬂecting various policy measures to stimulateinternational
trade).14 See Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma (2010) for a review of some of the theoret-
ical growth literature discussing the mechanisms through which our three “x” variables
may a ect long-run development, speciﬁcally GDP. Compared to much of the empirical
output growth literature, our “x” vector reﬂects a sizeably smaller set of regressors. We
allow for additional regressors that have been considered in the Barro regression based
empirical output growth literature to enter through two other aspects of our model: (i) the
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed-e ects intercepts and time trends, and (ii) the set of conditioning
variables z capturing the state dependence of the long-run development e ects of changes
14An inﬂation-based measure of monetary policy turned out to be insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, and
we thus do not report on it further in this paper.
15in government consumption, in investment in physical capital as well as in trade. As vari-
ables entering the set of conditioning state variables, we consider an index of institutional
development (instdev), an index of gender inequality (geninq), and an index of the devel-
opment conduciveness of the religious environment (condrel).15 For us to incorporate a
country in our sample, there must be 30 consecutive time-series observations available on
the dependent, all explanatory and all conditioning state variables. Table 1 provides a list
of the N = 84 countries among the 111 countries in the Gray Molina and Purser (2010)
data set that we can thus include in our sample. See Appendix A for details concerning
the measurement of our y and x variables.
Let us turn for the remainder of this section to a discussion of the measurement of our
three state indices. For institutional development - see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson
andRobinson(2005)and Rodrik, SubramanianandTrebbi(2004)forcontributionsstress-
ing the role of institutions for a country’s economic development - we use the dynamic
state-space model based index from Binder and Georgiadis (2010) with the component
variables corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, investment proﬁle and internal
conﬂict, all drawn from the Political Risk Services Group’s International Country Risk
Guide, see Binder and Georgiadis (2010) for further details. As an illustration, Figure
6 provides the institutional development ranking sorted from highest (Finland) to lowest
(Democratic Republic of Congo) levels of institutional development (the higher the index
value, the higher the country’s institutional quality). Motivating our second index, gender
inequality, there is considerable concern expressed in the development economics liter-
ature about the role societal inequality may play as an obstacle to human development
progressing to its potential; see, for example, the Human Development Report 1995. In
this paper, we measure gender inequality on the basis of (i) the di erence between the
15We abandoned attempts to also consider an index of income inequality, due to a lack of observations
covering su ciently long time intervals for a reasonably large number of countries in the United Nations’
WIDER database.
16ratio of a country’s female to male gross enrolment in primary schooling and the grand
cross-country average of this ratio and of (ii) the di erence between the ratio of female to
male life expectancy and the grand cross-country average of this ratio. Excluding females
from access to education induces a gender bias due to the ensuing unequal distribution of
human capital in the population; relative life expectancy of females compared to males
is an indicator for gender bias as it is critically inﬂuenced by gender bias in health care
and nutrition.16 As an illustration, Figure 7 provides the gender inequality ranking for
2005, sorted from the lowest (Iran) to the highest (Niger) degree of observed such in-
equality (that is, the higher the index value for gender inequality, the more successful
a country has been in moving towards gender equality). Our third index, development
conduciveness of the religious environment, is motivated by the observation that the re-
cent empirical growth literature (see, for example, Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller,
2004) has accumulated evidence that religious a nities are among the most robust out-
put growth determinants, even though the mechanisms through which religious a liation
a ects output growth are not clear. Our index of the development conduciveness of the
religious environment is constructed by summing up the products of (i) a population’s
proportion being muslim, protestant etc. and of (ii) the coe cient estimate of the latter
variable in the growth regressions of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). As
an illustration, Figure 8 provides the development conduciveness of the religious envi-
ronment ranking for 2005, sorted from the highest (Japan) to the lowest (Iceland) degree
of such development conduciveness. See Appendix B for further details concerning the
measurement of our state indices. As the state dependence of economic policies that we
model in Equation (6) concerns long-run dependence, for each of the conditioning state
indices we extract the underlying long-run evolution using a recursive Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter as detailed in Appendix B.4. For the conditioning functional, we work with ﬁrst-
16See Sen (2001) for a more thorough discussion.
17order Chebyshev polynomials, so that
  (zi,t 1) =   0 +   1 · zi,t 1, (12)
with   = 1,2,3.17
4 Empirical Findings
As motivated in detail in Section 3, we present estimation results and their substantive
economic implications for two models: The set of Barro regression models18
T
 1 · (yiT   yi0) =  0 +  1 · yi0 +  1 · govgdpi +  2 · invgdpi +  3 · openngdpi
+ 1 · instdevi +  2 · geninqi +  3 · condreli + viT, (13)
where yit is hdiit or gdpi, instdevi reﬂects institutional development, geninqit gender in-
equality, and condrelit development conduciveness of the religious environment, and the
set of state-dependent panel data models
 yit = µi +  i · t +  i ·
 
yi,t 1    1(zi,t 1) · lgovpci,t 1    2(zi,t 1) · linvpci,t 1




i · hit +  it, (14)
17While we also considered higher-order Chebyshev polynomials introducing yet richer forms of non-
linearities, for reasons of parsimony we decided to restrict ourselves in this paper to ﬁrst-order polynomial
speciﬁcations.
18The regressors in Equation (13) except for yi0 are intertemporal averages over the sample period. Also,
to stay as close as possible to the typical formulationof Barro regressionsin the empirical growth literature,
government consumption, investment in physical capital and imports plus exports enter Equation (13) as
ratios relative to GDP, govgdpi, invgdpi and openngdpi, respectively.
18where yit is again hdiit or gdpit, and zit is one of instdevit, geninqit, or condrelit.19 See
Section 3 for a description of all the variables.
Tables 2 and 3 provide the coe cient estimates as well as implied speed of convergence
coe cients for the Barro regression model.20 There are two main dimensions of results
for the Barro regression model: The speed of convergence to the steady state and the
quantitative role of the various development determinants. With respect to the speed of
convergence, the implied half-life for GDP for our sample is longer than reported in some
of the previous literature (for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), but shorter than
implied by the results in Gray Molina and Purser (2010).21 The half-lives tend to be
signiﬁcantly longer for HDI than for GDP, with the half-life of GDP in the model in-
cluding the complete set of regressors being about 56% shorter than that for HDI. With
respect to the development determinants, for the three regressors capturing or reﬂecting
macroeconomic policies aimed at improving human development, except for trade open-
ness these enter all Barro regressions with the same sign: a negative sign for government
consumption (as also in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) and a positive sign for investment
in physical capital. Trade openness has a negative sign in all regressions when HDI is
chosen as the dependent variable, but a positive sign in one of the four regressions for the
case of GDP being the left-hand side variable. Trade globalization has, however, in any
case only insigniﬁcant e ects on HDI and GDP. For the state variables reﬂecting social
norms, institutions and other societal characteristics - institutional development, gender
inequality,22 and development conduciveness of the religious environment - these have
signiﬁcant e ects both in the HDI and in the GDP model, with the sole exception being
19Note that for the CPMG panel data model in Equation (14), all regressors enter in their original time-
varying format. See Section 3 for further discussion.
20See Appendix C for a derivation of the length of the half-lives implied by Equations (13) and (14).
21Some of the half-lives implied by the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) regressions are di cult to inter-
pret, as they involve the initial level of GDP per capita even when the dependent variable is HDI.
22Recall that the higher the index value for gender inequality, the more successful a country has been in
moving towards gender equality.
19institutional development for HDI. Generally, according to the Barro regression model,
investment in physical capital, reduction of gender inequality and a conducive religious
environment appear to be the main determinants spurring long-run human development
and output growth. Institutional quality appears to matter for long-run output develop-
ment, but not for that of HDI. Fiscal (government consumption) stimuli, whether due to
interest rate e ects or due to accompanying distortionary tax schemes are harmful for
long-run output development, and insigniﬁcant for HDI. Trade globalization, ﬁnally, ac-
cording to the Barro regression model appears insigniﬁcant for both long-run GDP and
HDI development.
Let us turn to the estimation results for our state-dependent panel model. As for the Barro
regressions, we begin with commenting on the speeds of convergence to steady state/half-
lives. In Tables 4 to 6 we provide the means and medians of the country-speciﬁc speed
of adjustment parameter estimates for the various dependent and conditioning state vari-
ables. For example, when choosing institutional development as conditioning state vari-
able and HDI as the dependent variable (Table 4), the average speed of adjustment of
the 24 OECD economies in our sample is -0.1. The half-lives obtained from the state-
dependent panel model are across the board much shorter than those obtained from the
Barro regressions. To just give a couple of examples: For HDI, under the Barro regres-
sion the half-life, though depending on the details of the model speciﬁcation, tends to be
at least 78.1 years, but under the state-dependent panel model falls to somewhere between
three to 17 years. For the logarithm of GDP, under the Barro regressions, the half-lives
reduce up to 39 years, but are down to one year under the state-dependent panel model.
As our dynamic panel framework is designed to ﬁlter out country-speciﬁc short-run dy-
namics, this result is not due to confusing short- with long-run dynamics, but rather a
consequence of the fact that our panel model captures both short- and long-term cross-
countryheterogeneities, andcanbesuccessfulincapturingtheadjustmentdynamicstothe
20relevant conditional, country-speciﬁc long-run equilibrium. In general, across the three
di erent index variables capturing state dependence - institutional development, gender
inequality, and developmentconducivenessof the religious environment - we observe that
conditioning on these for GDP has quite similar e ects across the three index variables.
The GDP adjustment processes across the three index variables tend to be fastest for the
LDCs, and relatively slowest for the OECD economies. For HDI, the half-lives do not
just vary across country groupings, but also vary noticeably across the di erent speciﬁca-
tions of state dependence. This reinforces the point that Barro regressions mask sizeable
variation of half-lives, and that half-lives will change as the overall development environ-
ment within which economic policies are pursued is evolving. For example, the half-life
for HDI in Sub-Saharan Africa when conditioning long-run development on institutional
quality (six years) is about half as long than when conditioning long-run development
on gender inequality (twelve years). Thus, HDI adjustments for Sub-Saharan Africa are
slowed down notably more strongly by cross-country di erences in institutional quality
than in gender inequality. While the di erence with the exception of the LDCs is less pro-
nounced for other country groupings, di erences in institutional quality generally appear
to be delaying long-run adjustment more sizeably than di erences in gender inequality.
Di erences in the development conduciveness of the religious environment are a major
factor for such delay also, for some country groupings (most pronouncedly Asia) in even
more accentuated form than institutional quality issues.
Concerning the estimated long-run coe cient functionals for the state-dependent panel
model in Equation (14) several observations stand out, as displayed in Figures 9 to 11.
First, the ﬁgures, most strongly for GDP, but on a diminished scale also for HDI, indi-
cate strong state dependence of the development e ects of economic policy changes, as
the estimated long-run coe cient functionals exhibit sizeable variation across di erent
values of the conditioning state indices. The degree of state dependence highlights the
21cost of (erroneously) imposing cross-country homogeneity of the long-run development
e ects of changes in economic policy. Let us turn second to speciﬁc policy variables and
conditioning state indices. Considering among the latter ﬁrst institutional development,
the sign of the long-run e ects of a ﬁscal (government consumption) stimulus varies for
both HDI and GDP across di erent levels of institutional quality. For countries with low
institutional quality, government consumption stimuli positively a ect long-run HDI and
GDP, but for countries with high institutional quality, the long-run development e ects
are negative, as for the Barro regression model. The scope of ﬁscal policy in the form
of government consumption is much more limited for countries in which institutions are
highly developed already. Strong institutional development, on the other hand, increases
the long-run development e ects of both investment in physical capital and of trade glob-
alization, both for HDI and GDP, but again the stronger e ects materializing for GDP.
Taken together, the ﬁscal (government consumption) stimulus and physical capital invest-
ment e ects suggest that while government consumption expenditure in countries with
strong institutional development is not a suitable vehicle for long-run growth, a di er-
ent assessment may hold for government investment expenditure. With respect to gender
inequality, state variation of HDI developmente ects of economic policy changes is actu-
ally more pronounced across di erent stages of gender (in-)equality than across di erent
stages of institutional development. The strongest variation is observed for the long-run
HDI e ects of changes in investment in physical capital, with these being about half a
percentage point higher in countries exhibiting (relative) success at moving towards gen-
der equality. The scale with which variations in gender inequality a ect long-run GDP
developmentis small when compared with the corresponding scale for institutionaldevel-
opment. Also, as indicated by the standard error bands in Figure 10, there is uncertainty
regarding how the long-run GDP e ects of physical capital investment vary across stages
of gender (in-)equality. Turning ﬁnally to development conduciveness of the religious
22environment, while the scale of state variation of the policy e ects is large for GDP and
relatively large for HDI, the individual policy e ect variations seem at best di cult to
rationalize. Why, for example, would the long-run increase of GDP per capita be about
one whole percentage point larger in an environment in which the mix of religious af-
ﬁliations is slightly more growth conducive? From our perspective, the magnitude with
which the development e ects of macroeconomic policies vary across di erent religious
environments make yet more transparent than for the Barro regressions that the religious
a liation variables proxy for other societal characteristics, possibly includingsocial trust,
and thus should not be taken at face value. For the remainder of this paper, therefore, we
do not further pursue models that contain the religious environment index.
Exploiting the rich dynamic structure of our state-dependent panel model, we next com-
pute dynamic multipliers depicting the full adjustment paths of HDI and of GDP per
capita in response to a permanent ten percentage points increase in one of the economic
policy variables. We compare the dynamic multipliers obtained from our state-dependent
dynamic panel model with the time path of the e ect of the corresponding change in the
economic policy variables in period t = 0 obtained from the Barro regression frame-
work.23 To be speciﬁc about the computation of the dynamic multipliers, consider ﬁrst
the Barro regression model in Equation (7),
T
 1 · (yiT   yi0) =  0 +  1 · yi0 +  
  · xi +  
  · zi + ui.
Neglecting any transitional dynamics, a policy change in the  -th x regressor implies a
23Itis certainlysensibletoarguethatchangesin, say,governmentconsumptionwillingeneralalsoinduce
changes in physical capital investment and in international trade. However, as here we wish to emphasize
the comparison between intertemporal adjustments as conventionally computed for the Barro regression
model and those implied by our state-dependent panel model, we stick to computing orthogonal dynamic
multipliers.
23change in the long-run level of the dependent variable given by
  y
 
iT   yiT = T ·    · (  xi    xi ), (15)
where   xi  denotes the value of the  -th regressor after the policy change, and   y 
iT the
corresponding new long-run level of yi. In case the dependent variable is HDI,   y 
iT  
yiT reﬂects the level change of HDI relative to its baseline level after all adjustment has
taken place. In case the dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP per capita,  y 
iT   yiT
reﬂects the percentage change of GDP per capita relative to its baseline level after all
adjustment has taken place.24 Recall that in the Barro regression model the x variables
are measured as shares of GDP, while the x variables in the state-dependent panel data
model are measured as per capita quantities. In order to work with comparable shocks
in the two models, for each country we calculate the increase in the share of x  in GDP
implied by a ten percent increase in x  in the state-dependent panel model, and use the
implied change in the share of x  in GDP as the shock to the Barro regression model.
Turning now to transitional dynamics, as follows from Appendix C.1, the transition path
leading to the new long-run level of the dependent variable in the Barro regression model
is given by
yit   yi0 = (1   e
  t) · (  y
 
iT   yi0), (16)
with   =  log(1 + T 1)/T. For the calculation of the dynamic multipliers in the state-
dependent panel model, see Appendix D. The dynamic multipliers in Figure 13 display
for all 84 countries in our sample the percentage change of HDI and of GDP per capita in
response to a ten percentage points increase in one of the economic policy variables. To
structure the large number of multipliers we compute, we decided to assign countries to
one of three cross-country clusters, based on their observed average values of the condi-
24See Appendix D for further details concerning the computation of the dynamic multipliers.
24tioningstateindices institutionaldevelopmentand gender inequality,and with the clusters
constructed to create relatively homogenous country groupings according to the two state
indices institutional development and gender inequality. We assign each country to one
of these clusters: Cluster 1 containing all countries scoring well below average on gen-
der inequality and at most average on institutional development; Cluster 2 containing all
countries scoring in the extended medium range of values for institutional development
and close to average or better on gender inequality; and Cluster 3 ﬁnally containing all
countries scoring at least in the 80% percentile on institutional development - all these
countries happen to have an average or higher score on gender inequality. See Figure
12 for a graphical illustration that these three clusters naturally emerge when considering
the two state indices institutional development and gender inequality, and Table 7 for a
listing of the countries within these three clusters. Each dynamic multiplier trajectory
in Figure 13 corresponds to the average trajectory across the conditioning state indices
institutional development and gender inequality: For each of these two indices, we trace
the in-sample e ects of a period t = 0 (ten percent) increase of the x variable in ques-
tion if the state index had evolved as it actually did in sample.25 The Barro regression
based multipliers are, of course, state invariant and thus do not involve averaging across
state indices. The left column in Figures 13 and 14 depicts the dynamic multipliers for
all three clusters and all three economic policy variables under HDI being the dependent
variable, and the right column depicts the dynamic multipliers under the logarithm of
GDP per capita being the dependent variable. In each panel, the solid lines depict dy-
namic multipliers obtained from the state-dependent panel model in Equation (14), and
the starred lines depict the dynamic multipliers implied by the Barro regression model as
given by Equation (16). Figure 13 depicts for the state-dependent panel model the dy-
25As the dynamic multipliers for our dynamic panel model are state dependent, there are other possibili-
ties to computedynamicmultipliers, includingintegratingout the state dependence. See Koop, Pesaran and
Potter (1996) for a general discussion in the time-series context.
25namic multipliers for each country within a given cluster, whereas Figure 14 displays the
averages of thesedynamicmultipliersacross countries in a givencluster. Finally in Figure
14, the dash-dot line depicts the long-run e ects as implied by the state-dependent panel
model. Several observations stand out upon inspection of Figures 13 and 14. First, there
is considerable heterogeneity across clusters in both the short- and the long-run e ects of
the policy changes on both HDI and GDP per capita as implied by the state-dependent
panel model. As just one example, while for countries in Cluster 3 GDP per capita grows
strongly after an increase in investment in physical capital, the e ects of such a stim-
ulus are concentrated around zero for countries in Cluster 1. This heterogeneity of the
dynamic multipliers in part reﬂects, of course, the state dependence of the long-run co-
e cient functionals discussed earlier in this section. It also reﬂects the country-speciﬁc
short-run dynamics inherent in our state-dependent panel model. The latter two sources
of cross-country heterogeneity are also prominently present in the dynamic multipliers
reﬂecting the GDP e ects of a ﬁscal (government consumption) stimulus: While the av-
erage long-run e ects after a modest initial GDP gain are negative for Cluster 3, they
are positive for Clusters 1 and 2, though for these clusters also the short-run e ects are
larger in magnitude than the long-run e ects. Even in countries with limited institutional
development, therefore, the development scope of ﬁscal policy (in the form of govern-
ment consumption stimuli) is limited. Second, the policy e ects on HDI implied by the
state-dependent panel model generally tend to be quantitatively, but in some instances
also qualitatively di erent from those on GDP per capita. For example, while an increase
in trade openness leads to an accumulating gain in GDP per capita across all clusters, the
same stimulus across all clusters negatively a ects HDI. The dynamic multipliers gener-
ally make clear that the range of macroeconomic policies we consider impact HDI on a
scale often about one tenth of that for the GDP impacts, both in the short and in the long
run. Third, both the short- and the long-run development e ects in the state-dependent
26panel model are generally di erent from the corresponding e ects in the Barro regression
model, not least because the Barro model implies homogenous e ects across all coun-
tries and features linear adjustment processes. Only for speciﬁc cases are the multiplier
e ects implied by the Barro regression model similar to the multiplier e ects implied by
the state-dependent panel model. In general, even if one is interested in average e ects
across certain societal characteristics, these cannot be well measured by a model neglect-
ing prevailing key heterogeneities.
Tables 8 and 9 focus on the long-horizon e ects of the various economic policy changes
depicted in Figures 13 and 14, with Table 8 providing the development e ects after 20
years, and Table 9 providing these e ects in the steady state.26 The two tables highlight
some commonalities in the long-horizon development e ects of changes in our three eco-
nomic policy variables. Stimuli in investment in physical capital across all three country
clusters and for both HDI and GDP have positive long-horizon e ects - though the GDP
e ects are signiﬁcantly larger than those for HDI. For both HDI and GDP these e ects
appear noticeably smaller, though, than suggested by the Barro regression model. For
ﬁscal (government consumption) stimuli, as noted earlier, state conditioning plays a par-
ticulary pronounced role, in that for both HDI and GDP the long-horizon e ects diminish
with advances in institutional development (and for HDI also with advances in gender
inequality) - for the GDP e ects, these even turn negative, as also noted earlier. The
Barro regression model, though, seems to overstate the extent to which government con-
sumption stimuli may have detrimental long-term development e ects. Last in terms of
commonalities of long-horizon e ects, it is notable that across all three of our country
clusters the long-horizon e ect of increased international trade are negative for HDI, and
(sizeably) positive for GDP.
26Table 9 also lists the steady state e ects implied by the Barro regression models that were not plotted
in Figures 13 and 14.
27Let us ﬁnally discuss the relation between our ﬁndings in this section and those in Section
2. In Section 2, we had found evidence (see in particular Figures 1, 3 and 5) that HDI
would exhibit unconditional convergence features not present in GDP. In this section, we
found evidence that countries’ long-run development paths are state dependent, and that
the conditional convergence process for HDI tends to be much more drawn out than that
for GDP. Table 10 indicates a likely source for this apparent discrepancy of ﬁndings: At
least for Africa and Asia, but to a weaker degree also for the OECD countries, there is
(panel unit root test based) evidence that HDI is a unit root process; also, GDP appears to
be a unit root process across all country groupings. While the (popular) methodology em-
ployed in Section 2 is not valid in the presence of a unit root (bounded second moments
then do not exist; a regression of the level of a variable on its growth rate is unbalanced
and yields inconsistent parameter estimates), our state-dependent panel model is appli-
cable even in the presence of unit roots. The latter model’s implications that both HDI
and GDP converge conditionally to state-dependent development paths, with HDI adjust-
ment signiﬁcantly moredrawn out than GDP adjustmenttherefore need to be taken at face
value. In Section 2, we had also found evidence that long-run levels development of HDI
is quite closely aligned with that for GDP, but that such close alignment is not present in
growth rates, even at a 35 years horizon. These ﬁndings are consistent with the empir-
ical evidence accumulated in this section: While HDI and GDP may feature a common
stochastic trend, some core economic policies have notably di erent e ects on HDI vs.
GDP growth even at extended horizons. It remains a question that is beyond the scope of
this paper, though, to characterize the key factors underlying a common stochastic trend
in HDI and GDP.
285 Conclusion
In this paper, we have applied a novel dynamic panel data model with state-dependent
coe cients to study the e ects of a set of macroeconomic policies - investment in phys-
ical capital, government consumption and trade openness - on the development of HDI
and GDP per capita. In contrast to the Barro regression model framework, the panel data
model we apply does not require to a priori impose a decomposition of the data into
short- and long-run dynamics, is able to account for potential endogeneity of the policy
variables, allows for a high degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the developmentpro-
cess, and is able to assess the quantitative role of countries’ persistent characteristics such
as institutionalquality,gender(in-)equalityand religiousenvironment. Amongthekeyin-
sights that have emerged from our analysis are: First, HDI development on various counts
di ers notably from that of GDP. While both HDI and GDP exhibit conditional (though
not unconditional) cross-country convergence properties, the HDI adjustment process is
slower than that for GDP. Realizing gains in HDI development requires more patience
than in the case for GDP development policies. Also, macroeconomic policies such as
international trade integration, stimulation of investment in physical capital and govern-
ment consumption stimuli that may spur GDP development relatively notably will have
less pronounced e ects for HDI. HDI development policies should look beyond the realm
of GDP development policies. Second, there are sizeable and important heterogeneities
in the development e ects of macroeconomic policies across countries. Cross-country
di erences in social norms and institutions may translate into di erences in both the tran-
sitional dynamics and the long-run e ects implied by economic policy changes. Our
ﬁndings in this regard underline the fallacy of “one size ﬁts all” recipes, and highlight the
importance of observing local conditions for the formulation of development strategies.
Onekey exampleofthisis that ﬁscal stimuliin the form ofgovernmentconsumptionposi-
29tively a ect GDP in countries with low institutionalquality, but negativelya ect long-run
GDP in countries with high institutional quality. The range of economic policies and so-
cietal characteristics rendering the development e ects of changes in such policies state
dependent we have considered in this paper is rather limited. This is primarily due to
data limitations that can hinder estimation of the state-dependent panel model even when
a corresponding Barro regression model can be estimated. Much work on data measure-
ment thus remains, and some of our other current work (see Binder and Georgiadis, 2010)
is making start to remedy such limitations.
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32A Data for Dynamic Panel Model’s Dependent and Ex-
planatory Variables
Data for GDP, government consumption, investment in physical capital, and imports plus
exports are taken from the Penn World Tables Mark 6.3. Data for HDI are taken from the
Gray Molina and Purser (2010) data set.
B Construction of the State Indices
B.1 Institutional Development
The institutional development index is taken from Binder and Georgiadis (2010), and is
based on data on corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, investment proﬁle and
internal conﬂict, all drawn from the Political Risk Services Group’s International Country
Risk Guide.
B.2 Gender Inequality
Our gender inequality index is obtained on the basis of (i) the di erence between the
ratio of a country’s female to male gross enrollment in primary schooling and the cross-
country grand average of this ratio and of (ii) the di erence between the ratio of female
to male life expectancy and the cross-country grand average of this ratio, with both series
obtaining equal weight in index construction. The data are taken from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators 2008.
33B.3 Development Conduciveness of Religious Environment
Our index of the development conduciveness of the religious environment is obtained by
summing up the products of (i) a population’s proportion being muslim, protestant, bud-
dhist, catholic, orthodox, hindu and believingin eastern religionsand of (ii)thecoe cient
estimate of the latter variable in the growth regressions of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and
Miller (2004). The data on religious a liations we use are updates of a data set originally
compiled by Barro and McCleary (2003).
B.4 Extracting the Trend Component
To extract the trend component from each of the series for {zi,t 1}i=1,2,...,N;t=1,2,...,T, while
ensuring that the trend component remains pre-determined and thus not complicating es-
timation of our state-dependent panel model, we
(i) keep the ﬁrst four observations zi,t 1, t = 1,2,3,4, and set t = 5;
(ii) apply a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to {zi0,zi1,...,zi,t 1};
(iii) extract the trend component zTR
i,t 1;
(iv) save zTR
i,t 1 and set t = t + 1;
(v) repeat steps (ii) to (iv) until t = T.
The conditioning state variable we use for estimation of our state-dependent panel model
is given by the vector (zi0,zi1,zi2,zi3,zTR
i4 ,zTR
i5 ,...,zTR
i,T 1) . To keep the notation simple,
while using the trend components of the conditioning state variables for estimation pur-
poses, elsewhere in the paper we drop the “TR” superscript even when referring to the
trend component of the conditioning state variable.
34C SpeedsofAdjustmentsandHalfLivesin theBarroRe-
gression and State-Dependent Dynamic Panel Models
C.1 Barro Regression Model
In the deterministic continuous-time Solow-Swan growth model, the rate of change of
output in per capita e ciency units, yE
it = Yit/(AitLit), with Yit denoting output (GDP), Lit
the size of the labor force, and Ait the level of technology, is a decreasing function of the
levelofoutputinpercapitae ciency units,that is ˙ yE/yE = ˙ yE(i,t,yE)/yE,  (˙ yE/yE)/ yE <
0, and at the steady-state the change is zero so that ˙ yE(i,t,yE 
i )/yE = 0. Noting that
˙ yE/yE = dlog(yE)/dt := ˙ lyE, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of the rate of change of
output in per capita e ciency units around the steady-state level yE 
i is given by
˙ lyE(i,t,y
E)   ˙ lyE(i,t,y
E 
i ) +
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Movingto a model in discrete timefor which dataare observable, with Ait   Ai0·exp(g·t),
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35where  1 =  T 1 ·
 
1   exp(  T)
 
. Tacking on a stochastic disturbance term vi,27 assum-
ing log(Ai0) =    · zi + log(A0) +ei, where zi is a vector of variables capturing predictable
heterogeneity in initial technology, log(Ai0), and using the steady-state solution for the
standard Solow growth model with saving rate s and Yit = K 
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where  i = vi    1 · ei.28 The coe cient  1 in the Barro regression model in Equation (7)
is thus related to the parameter   in an underlying Solow growth model according to
  =  
log(1 + T ·  1)
T
. (C.5)
The parameter   determines the half-life of deviations from a country’s steady-state, as
from Equation (C.2) we have that
lyE(i,tHL)   lyE 
i
lyE(i,0)   lyE 
i
=
ly(i,tHL)   log(Ait)   ly 
i + log(Ait)
ly(i,0)   log(Ait)   ly 
i + log(Ait)
= e










C.2 State-Dependent Dynamic Panel Model
To derive the half-life in our state-dependent panel model, consider an autoregressive
representation of wit = log(yit), assuming for simplicity of exposition a deterministic
27It may not be innocuous to additively tack on a stochastic disturbance term to the solution of a deter-
ministic growth model; see Binder and Pesaran (1999).
28See Rodr´ ıguez (2007) for how the e ects of the variables capturing predictable heterogeneity in initial
technology could enter the Barro regression model in a non-linear form.
36model with a ﬁrst-order lag structure,
wit = di +  i · wi,t 1
=  
t
i · wi0 +
1    t
i
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i). (C.8)
From Equation (C.8) it is easy to see that
wHL
it   w 
i










In the state-dependent panel model considered in Equation (6), w 
i =  (z 
i)  · x 
i and  i =
1 +  i.
D ComputationofDynamicMultipliersintheState-Dependent
Dynamic Panel Data Model
Let us rewrite the state-dependent dynamic panel model in Equation (6) as
yit = µi +  i · t + ( i1 +  i2 + ... +  ip) · yi,t 1 + ( i0 +  i1 + ... +  iq)
  · xit
+
p 1  
 =1
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q 1  
 =0
 





           
 
·  xi,t   +  it (D.1)
= µi +  i · t + ( i + 1) · yi,t 1    i ·  
 (zi,t 1) · xit
+
p 1  
 =1
 i  ·  yi,t   +
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37Estimates of the slope coe cients in Equation (D.2) can be used to compute estimates of
 ik, k = 1,2,..., p,  ik, k = 0,1,...,q, from Equation (D.1) as
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for   = 1,2,...,m. Using  ik, k = 1,2,..., p,  ik, k = 0,1,...,q, a simulated series
{  yit} for which   x ir = x ir + impulse, t   r, is generated, and the dynamic multipliers
for   = 1,2,...,m, t = r,r + 1,...,Ti, are obtained by subtracting {yit} from {  yit}. We
set impulse = 0.1 and for {x ir} we use country i’s actual values of lgovpc, linvpc, and
lopennpc.
38E Figures
Figure 1: Evolution of the Moments of HDI in the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) Data
Set
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Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-country mean, median and standard deviation of HDI for N = 84 countries from the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) data set for
the time period from 1970 to 2005. The upper left-hand panel plots the evolution of the mean, the upper right-hand panel plots the evolution of the median, and the lower panel
plots the evolution of the standard deviation. In each panel, the evolution of the mean, the median, and the standard deviation is plotted for the full sample (“world”),as well as the
OECD, Asian, African, and Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of this “world” sample.
39Figure 2: Evolution of the Cross-Sectional Distribution of HDI in the Gray Molina and





























































































































Latin America and the Caribbean
Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of HDI for N = 84 countries from the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) data set for the time period from
1970 to 2005. The upper left-hand panel plots theevolution of thecross-sectional distributionof HDI forthe full sample(“world”),theupper right-hand panel plots thisdistribution
for the OECD, the middle left-hand panel plots this distribution for the African countries, the middle right-hand panel plots this distribution for the Asian countries, and the lower
panel plots this distribution for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of this “world” sample. In each panel, the horizontal axes display the time period and the
scale for HDI, and the vertical axis displays the estimated density.
40Figure 3: Evolution of the Moments of the Logarithm of GDP per Capita in the Penn
World Tables 6.3
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Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-country mean, median, and standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita for N = 84 countries from the Gray Molina
and Purser (2010) data set for the time period from 1970 to 2005. See the Note to Figure 1.
41Figure 4: Evolution of the Cross-Sectional Distribution of the Logarithm of GDP per














































































































Latin America and the Caribbean
Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of the logarithm of GDP per capita for N = 84 countries from the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) data set
for the time period from 1970 to 2005. See the Note to Figure 2.
42Figure 5: Correlation Between Trends in HDI and GDP per Capita Between 1970 and
2005




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The graphs depict correlations between HDI in 2005 and the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005 (upper left-hand panel), the change in HDI and in GDP per capita growth
between 1970 and 2005 (upper right-hand panel), HDI in 1970 and the change in HDI between 1970 and 2005 (lower left-hand panel), and the logarithmof GDP per capita in 1970
and GDP per capita growth between 1970 and 2005 (lower right-hand panel). In each panel, the dashed line shows ﬁtted values from an OLS regression of the variable displayed
on the vertical axis on the variable displayed on the horizontal axis after controlling for an intercept in both variables.
43Figure 6: Country Rankings for the Institutional Development Index in 2005





















































































Note: The graph depicts the cross-country ranking of institutional development for 2005. The countries are sorted from highest to lowest ranks of institutional development. The
length of each bar reﬂects the value of the institutional development index in 2005.
44Figure 7: Country Rankings for the Gender Inequality Index in 2005





















































































Note: The graph depicts the cross-country ranking of gender inequality for 2005. The countries are sorted from lowest to highest degrees of gender inequality. The length of each
bar reﬂects the degree to which a country has achieved gender equality.
45Figure 8: Country Rankings for the Development Conduciveness of the Religious Envi-
ronment in 2005





















































































Note: The graph depicts the cross-country ranking of the index of development conduciveness of the religious environment for 2005. The countries are sorted from highest to
lowest degrees of development conduciveness of the religious environment. The length of each bar reﬂects the degree to which a country’s religious environment is conducive for
development.
46Figure 9: Institutional Development Index





































































































































Note: The graph depicts the estimated long-run multiplier functionals   k(zi,t 1) from Equation (14) with the conditioning index zi,t 1 being institutional development.
For each choice of the dependent variable the graph presents two sets of results. First, in the left column for HDI the long-run percentage change of HDI in response to a
one basis point increase in the corresponding explanatory variable is depicted (as the long-run coe cient in case of HDI being the dependent variable does not represent
an elasticity, the reported percentage change is evaluated at each country’s initial value of HDI). Second, in the right column for HDI, the long-run coe cient functional
estimates themselves are depicted. For GDP per capita, the left column depicts the long-run percentage change of GDP per capita in response to a one percentage change
in the corresponding explanatory variable, and the right column the long-run coe cient functional estimates. In each panel, the solid line depicts the point estimates, and
the dashed lines depict 95% conﬁdence bands. The scales in the ﬁrst and third columns from the left are adjusted to be the same for the HDI and GDP per capita graphs.
47Figure 10: Gender Inequality
HDI Logarithm of GDP Per Capita













































































































































Note: The graph depicts the estimated long-run multiplier functional   k(zi,t 1) from Equation (14) with the conditioning index zi,t 1 being gender inequality. Recall, that
the higher the index value for gender inequality, the more successful a country has been in moving towards gender equality. For further details, see the Note to Figure 9.
48Figure 11: Development Conduciveness of the Religious Environment
HDI Logarithm of GDP Per Capita






































































































































Note: The graph depictsthe estimated long-runmultiplierfunctional   k(zi,t 1) from Equation (14) with the conditioningindex zi,t 1 being thedevelopment conduciveness
of the religious environment. For further details, see the Note to Figure 9.
49Figure 12: The Country Clusters






















































































Note: The graph depicts a scatter plot of countries’ average institutional development index values against countries’ average gender inequality index values. The brightness of the
country codes indicates the adherence of the countries to our three country clusters.
50Figure 13: Dynamic Multipliers Across Clusters
HDI Logarithm of GDP Per Capita
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LOPENNPC, LGDPPC : Cluster 3
Note: Each sub-panel displays the dynamic multipliers (solid lines) for a permanent ten basis points increase for a given explanatory variable and given choice of the dependent
variable in a given cluster. Also depicted in each sub-panel is the corresponding multiplier (transition path) implied by the Barro regression model (starred line). For example,
the upper left-hand panel depicts the dynamic responses of HDI for all countries in Cluster 1 for a permanent ten basis points increase in government consumption expenditure as
implied by the state-dependent panel model in Equation (14) and the Barro regression model. 51Figure 14: Cluster-Average Dynamic Multipliers
HDI Logarithm of GDP Per Capita
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LOPENNPC, LGDPPC : Cluster 3
Note: Each sub-panel depicts the cluster average of the dynamic multipliers for the state-dependent panel model as plotted in Figure 13. Also depicted in each sub-panel is the
corresponding multiplier (transition path) implied by the Barro regression model. For example, in the upper left-hand panel the average dynamic responses for HDI of all countries
in Cluster 1 (solid line) to a permanent ten basis points increase in government consumption expenditure is graphed together with the corresponding quantity implied by the Barro
regression model (starred line) and the long-run e ect implied by the state-dependent panel model (dash-dot line). 52F Tables
Table 1: Countries Included
Algeria Jordan
Argentina Kenya














Congo, Dem. Rep. Niger

























Note: The table lists the sub-set of countries in the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) data set included in our empirical
analysis.
53Table 2: Barro Regression with  hdi as Dependent Variable



























































R-Squared 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.41
Implied   0.0076 0.0089 0.0032 0.0078
Half-Life 91.6 78.1 > 100 88.8
N 84 84 84 84
Note: Absolute t-values in parenthses. *,** and *** indicate statistical sig-
niﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Table 3: Barro Regression with  lgdppc as Dependent Variable



























































R-Squared 0.5 0.33 0.27 0.63
Implied   0.0162 0.0079 0.0028 0.0177
Half-Life 42.8 87.9 > 100 39.2
N 84 84 84 84
Note: Absolute t-values in parenthses. *,** and *** indicate statistical sig-
niﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively.
54Table 4: Speed of Adjustment Parameters, zit: INSTDEV
yit: HDI yit: LGDPPC
Country Group Mean Median H-L N Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N
All Countries -0.12 -0.09 6 83 -0.54 -0.56 1 11 83
OECD -0.1 -0.06 7 24 -0.45 -0.42 1 14 24
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.11 -0.05 6 24 -0.62 -0.61 1 9 24
Latin America and Caribbean -0.2 -0.2 3 19 -0.53 -0.56 1 11 19
Asia -0.06 -0.08 12 15 -0.54 -0.61 1 11 15
LDCs -0.1 -0.05 7 16 -0.64 -0.62 1 8 16
Note: The table reports the speed of adjustment parameter estimates,    i from Equation (14) for the full sample, the OECD,
the Sub-Saharan African, the Latin American and Caribbean, the Asian and the Least Developed (LDCs) countries. In the
left results column of the table, the dependent variable is HDI, and in the right results column it is the logarithm of GDP
per capita. For a given choice of the dependent variable, the table reports the mean and the median across countries within a
given country group, the implied half life as well as the number of countries within the country group in question.
Table 5: Speed of Adjustment Parameters, zit: GENINQ
yit: HDI yit: LGDPPC
Country Group Mean Median H-L N Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N
All Countries -0.1 -0.09 7 83 -0.52 -0.51 1 11 83
OECD -0.09 -0.08 7 24 -0.41 -0.4 1 16 24
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.06 -0.07 12 24 -0.61 -0.55 1 9 24
Latin America and Caribbean -0.15 -0.14 4 19 -0.48 -0.43 1 13 19
Asia -0.04 -0.09 17 15 -0.54 -0.51 1 11 15
LDCs -0.04 -0.08 16 16 -0.64 -0.55 1 8 16
Note: The table reports the speed of adjustment parameter estimates,    i from Equation (14) for the full sample, the OECD,
the Sub-Saharan African, the Latin American and Caribbean, the Asian and the Least Developed (LDCs) countries. In the
left results column of the table, the dependent variable is HDI, and in the right results column it is the logarithm of GDP
per capita. For a given choice of the dependent variable, the table reports the mean and the median across countries within a
given country group, the implied half life as well as the number of countries within the country group in question.
Table 6: Speed of Adjustment Parameters, zit: CONDREL
yit: HDI yit: LGDPPC
Country Group Mean Median H-L N Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N
All Countries -0.14 -0.14 5 83 -0.53 -0.52 1 11 83
OECD -0.16 -0.16 4 24 -0.47 -0.48 1 13 24
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.08 -0.1 8 24 -0.57 -0.51 1 10 24
Latin America and Caribbean -0.16 -0.13 4 19 -0.49 -0.4 1 12 19
Asia -0.16 -0.18 4 15 -0.57 -0.53 1 10 15
LDCs -0.06 -0.08 11 16 -0.65 -0.57 1 8 16
Note: The table reports the speed of adjustment parameter estimates,    i from Equation (14) for the full sample, the OECD,
the Sub-Saharan African, the Latin American and Caribbean, the Asian and the Least Developed (LDCs) countries. In the
left results column of the table, the dependent variable is HDI, and in the right results column it is the logarithm of GDP
per capita. For a given choice of the dependent variable, the table reports the mean and the median across countries within a
given country group, the implied half life as well as the number of countries within the country group in question.
55Table 7: The Clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Algeria Argentina Australia
Bangladesh Bahrain Austria
Burkina Faso Bolivia Belgium
Cameroon Botswana Canada
Congo, Dem. Rep. Brazil Denmark
Cote d’Ivoire Chile Finland
Egypt China France
Ethiopia Colombia Iceland
Ghana Congo, Republic of Ireland
India Costa Rica Italy
Iran Cyprus Japan
Liberia Dominican Republic Luxembourg
Malawi El Salvador Netherlands





Senegal Israel United Kingdom
Sudan Jamaica United States
Togo Jordan
Tunisia Kenya




















INSTDEV 0.67 0.89 1.73
GENINQ 0.9 1.05 1.07
Note: The table detailsthe division of thefull sample into threeclusters of countries
based on their average institutional development and gender inequality scores. See
also Figure 12.
56Table 8: Development E ects of Policy Changes for Our Three Clusters of Countries: 20 Year Time Horizon
HDI LGDPPC
LGOVPC LINVPC LOPENNPC LGOVPC LINVPC LOPENNPC
Cluster 1 0.42 0.08 -0.38 1.40 0.34 1.99
Cluster 2 0.19 0.20 -0.24 1.44 0.43 1.94
Cluster 3 0.09 0.23 -0.16 -0.39 2.08 2.35
Barro -0.05 0.27 -0.01 -1.98 3.47 0.01
Note: The table displays in the rows labelled “Cluster 1”, “Cluster 2” and “Cluster 3” the average percentage change in HDI/GDP per capita after 20 years across all countries
in a given cluster implied within the state dependent panel model by a ten percentage points increase in government consumption, in investment in physical capital, and in trade
openness (exports plus imports). In the last row labelled “Barro”, we report the corresponding e ects implied by the Barro regression model.
5
7Table 9: Long-Run Development E ects of Policy Changes for Our Three Clusters of Countries
HDI LGDPPC
LGOVPC LINVPC LOPENNPC LGOVPC LINVPC LOPENNPC
Cluster 1 0.55 0.21 -0.49 1.55 0.42 2.11
Cluster 2 0.24 0.35 -0.33 1.39 0.60 2.11
Cluster 3 0.10 0.28 -0.19 -0.46 2.19 2.52
Barro -0.37 1.39 -0.06 -8.66 16.36 -0.07
Note: See the Note to Table 8. Rather than reporting development e ects for a time horizon of 20 years as Table 8 does, this table reports the long-run (steady state) development
e ects.
5
8Table 10: Panel Unit Root Tests for HDI Series and the Logarithm of GDP per Capita
p = 1 p = 2
HDI log GDP HDI log GDP
World 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.94
OECD 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.09
Latin America and Caribbean 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06
Africa 0.91 0.99 0.90 1.00
Asia 0.57 0.53 0.71 0.83
Note: The table reports p-values from panel unit root tests for HDI and the logarithm of GDP per capita. Under the null hypothesis
of the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, IPS) test, the series under investigation has a unit root for each individual unit in the panel. The
IPS test allows for country level ﬁxed e ects and ﬁxed e ects type linear time trends, as well as country-speciﬁc (systematically
varying) slope coe cients under the alternative hypothesis of mean reversion in the individual series.
59